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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. consumption tax-the sales and use tax-has been
plagued by a seemingly intractable problem: it is built on an
enforcement system that depends on seller-collection. But under
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, states cannot require "remote" sellers
(those without some kind of physical presence in the state) to collect
and remit the tax.' Consequently, states instead attempt to collect
the tax from resident purchasers through self-reporting-a method
that has proven to be much less effective.' Congress has the power to
grant states enforcement authority over remote sellers, but has long
denied that assistance to the states. But what if the states had an
alternative approach to enforcing the tax on remote purchases? And
what if this approach could be implemented without the need for
action by Congress or the Supreme Court? The "seeds" of that
approach have already been planted.
It is no surprise that state and local governments rely on sellers to
help enforce the sales and use tax imposed on purchases by
consumers. Sellers have the means to withhold and pay over the tax
received as part of the purchase price. Just as importantly, sellers
create information and maintain records in the regular course of
their business, which are necessary for determining and confirming
the proper amount of tax. Despite the limits imposed by the
Supreme Court,' this enforcement system worked well historically
because commercial success required physical proximity to markets.
But e-commerce has undermined this system.' As a result, states now
face a situation in which the parameters of the sales and use tax are
increasingly dictated not by the principles of good tax policy or
legislative choice, but by the limits of an outdated approach to
enforcement. This reality is especially evident in the extent to which

1. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311, 317 (1992).
2. See infra notes 93-100 (explaining why self-reporting has been less effective).
3. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 311, 317 (holding that under the Commerce
Clause, a state cannot require a remote seller to collect sales tax unless it has a
physical presence in the state).
4. See Donald Bruce et al., E-Tailer Sales Tax Nexus and State Tax Policies, 68 NAT'L
TAxJ. 735, 735-36 (2015), http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/09/E-Tailer.pdf ("Etailers can locate their revenue generating websites anywhere without affecting their
customers' shopping experience and can often exploit nationwide markets with
physical locations in only one or a few states. These characteristics provide e-tailers
with more locational flexibility than their bricks and mortar counterparts, and this
flexibility in turn may heighten the potential influence of state tax policies on
decisions about where to locate key operational assets.").
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state use taxes are generally collected on consumer purchases of
digital goods and services-which is seldom.
The conventional wisdom is that for the states to solve the sales tax
enforcement problem, and thus remove this barrier to taxing the
"new economy," one of two things must occur. Either Congress must
act to expand state jurisdiction to require remote-seller collection of
tax, or the Supreme Court must eliminate the bar created by its
precedent.' State and local governments have devoted substantial
time and resources to making progress down one or both of these
two paths, but with little success.' For nearly sixteen years, the

5. See Michael Mazerov, States Should Embrace 21st Century Economy by Extending
Sales Tax to DigitalGoods and Services, CTR. ON BUDGET & Po'Y PRIORTFES 1 (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/defailt/files/atoms/files/ 12-13-12sfp.pdf.
Mazerov notes
that some states have included certain digital goods in their tax bases and that the
revenue loss from states failing to do so is significant, but also cautions that
[tlhe major limitation on collecting the tax due arises from the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1992 Quill decision. The Court held in Quill that a state
cannot require an out-of-state seller to collect sales tax on sales to the state's
residents if the seller does not have a "physical presence"-facilities or
employees-within the state. By their very nature, most sales of digital goods
and services can be delivered over the Internet without the seller's physical
presence in the purchasers' states. While tax on the purchase is still legally
due directly from the purchaser, there is no effective way to enforce payment
by household purchasers.
Id. at 24-25 (footnote omitted); see Hayes R. Holderness, Revenue Department's Cloudy
Minds Lead to WrongAnswers, in STATE AND LOCAL TAXAnON 8-53 to 8-84 (8th ed. 2015).
6. See, e.g., H. Beau Baez III, Taxing Internet Sales: Trying to Make a Two-ThousandYear-Old jurisdiction Test Work in the Dot-Com Economy, 64 TAx LAW. 807, 849 (2011)
("The states should look not only to Congress but also to the Supreme Court to help
solve this problem."); Alexandria Rose Finch, Slow Connections for E-Tailer Nexus:
Bringing Sales and Use Taxes up to Speed in an E-Commerce Economy, 42 STETSON L. REV.
293, 320 (2012) ("First, it is clear from Quill, the [Internet Tax Freedom Act], the
individual state attempts to tax Internet sales, and the [Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Agreement] that any solution to the problem must come from the federal
level."); David H. Gershel, Comment, The Day of Reckoning: The Inevitable Application
of State Sales Tax to Electronic Commerce, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 335, 362
(2011) ("Whether Congress or the Supreme Court creates the standard for the
legality of click-through nexus laws, the building momentum behind this tax-ontechnology movement means the issue cannot be ignored for much longer.");
Geoffrey E. Weyl, Comment, Quibbling with Quill: Are States Powerless in Enforcing Sales
and Use Tax-Related Obligations on Out-of-State Retailers?, 117 PA. ST. L. RE,,. 253, 276
(2012) ("The solution to the out-of-state e-retailer sales tax collection problem must
come from Congress.").
7. See Marketplace Faimess-Big 7, NGA Letters, NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N (Nov. 8,
2014),
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/nga-letters/economicdevelopment-commerce-c/col2-content/main-content-list/inarketplace-fairnessbig-7.html (expressing, in a letter from the "Big 7" to the House and Senate
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Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement has attempted to simplify
the sales tax system so that Congress would be persuaded to grant tax
collection authority.' But, this effort, like others, has failed to reach
this goal. Recently, the National Conference of State Legislatures
advised state lawmakers that "[w]e cannot depend on Congress to
heed the calls of their state legislative partners" to solve the problem,'
urging states instead to act legislatively to expand tax collection
duties, challenging Supreme Court precedent, if necessary.o But for
the states to attempt to bring a direct challenge seeking to overturn
Supreme Court precedent only raises a number of other difficult issues."
This either-Congress-or-the-Supreme-Court formulation of the
necessary solution to the sales tax enforcement problem has a
number of flaws. First, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court is
obligated to address the issue, and neither seems in a hurry to do so.
Second, although it would be a simple matter for Congress or the
Court to expand the legal jurisdiction of the states (assuming they
wished to do so), legal jurisdiction alone does not solve the practical
problems of enforcing collection from remote actors. But perhaps
most importantly, this formulation imposes a false dichotomy-that
the solution must come from either Congress or the Supreme
Court-which assumes that there are no other options. But there
are, and perhaps it is time to consider them. 2
This Article posits that it is time for states to consider alternative
enforcement tools and to take advantage of the information
technology that makes electronic commerce possible. This Article
will not try to tackle the necessary technology requirements, although
Leadership, grave disappointment at Congress's failure to act on the Marketplace
Fairness Act). The Big 7 is composed of the following groups: the National Governors
Association, the Council of State Governments, National League of Cities, National
Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of Counties, United States
Conference of Mayors, and International City/County Management Association. Id.
8. About
Us,
STREAMLINED
SALEs
TAx
GOVERNING
BOARD,
INC.,
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=About-Us (last visited May 17,
2016); see also Diane Hardt, Sales Tax Reform: The Streamlined Sales Tax Project, in STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION, 6-54 to 6-76 (8th ed. 2015).
9. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL Asks Legislative Leaders to
Address Remote Sales Tax CollectionProblem, STATE TAx TODAYJan. 20, 2016, at 1.
10. Id.
11. The authors of this Article have considered these issues previously. See
generally Helen Hecht & Lila Disque, Direct Marketing Association and the Overture to
Overturn Quill, 25J. OF MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES,July 2015, at 6.
12. For some time, states have attempted to enforce tax collection directly on
consumers. This has been largely unsuccessful and this is not the approach
suggested by this Article.
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it certainly appears that they are well within the reach of the states.
Instead it considers whether this alternative is viable from a legal
perspective. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, this alternative is legally viable. However, this question is still
dependent on whether there are other constraints imposed by the
Constitution or federal statute.
This Article acknowledges that this alternative approach also
depends on the willingness of policy makers to take on potential
political opposition. Instead, of course, they might simply allow the
tail to continue to wag the dog-permitting the current enforcement
system to dictate the scope of the tax. But that will not necessarily be
an easy abdication.
The economic inefficiencies created by a
narrowing of the consumption base, the competitive disadvantages
imposed on local businesses, the actions of other countries in
enforcing their own consumption taxes on U.S. businesses, and the
limitations on revenue sources will create growing pressures to
which at least some states may respond. Assuming that even a few
intrepid lawmakers manage to create a viable enforcement
alternative, so as to allow the natural broadening of the tax base
and leveling of the competitive playing field, it will likely not take
long before there are many imitators.
This Article first looks briefly at the U.S. sales tax system and the
legal limits on the states' authority to use out-of-state sellers to collect
the tax. Next, this Article considers the decision of the European
Union (EU) to amend the value added tax (VAT) imposed by EU
countries so as to require all remote sellers of digital goods to collect
and remit sales taxes on a market-sourcing basis. Additionally, this
Article considers the EU's general approach to enforcement, the
inherent limitations of that approach, and other solutions being
discussed. Finally, this Article suggests how the holding by the Tenth
Circuit in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl' has opened up a new
enforcement approach and considers the legal questions that might
accompany this approach.
I.

THE U.S. SALES TAx SYSTEM AND RELATED ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

Consumption taxes are vitally important as a revenue source,
accounting for thirty-one percent of total revenues in certain

13.
14.

Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, No. 12-1175, 2016 WL 692500 (10th Cir. Feb. 22,2016).
814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
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developed countries in 2012.'1 Virtually every country today imposes
some form of sales tax or VAT.'" Consumption taxes traditionally rely
on seller or other third-party collection and reporting." Crossborder sales can, therefore, pose a particular enforcement problem."
If purchasers can buy from sellers operating outside the
government's jurisdiction so that the sellers have no obligation to
collect the tax or report information, consumption tax enforcement
will be much more difficult. Conspicuous systematic tax avoidance
can also undermine a voluntary tax system as a whole.
Of course, the enforcement role of third parties in state and
federal tax systems goes beyond the use of sellers to collect sales
taxes. For example, employers are routinely subjected to withholding
and reporting obligations for the personal income taxes or other
payroll taxes owed on wage income paid to individual employees
under federal and state tax laws." Furthermore, the role of third
parties in maintaining and reporting information is not simply
incidental to tax collection.20 While information reporting may or
may not be accompanied by a tax-collection or withholding
obligation, no collection or withholding obligation is ever imposed
without a corresponding information reporting requirement.2 To
the extent that the tax system depends upon complex rules applied
to specific facts, the ability of the third party to capture, process, and
report information is critical. So, for example, employers not only
withhold and pay over tax for employees, but they capture wage,
benefit, and expense reimbursement information and use that data
to file an IRS Form 940 return and to provide employees a Form W2.22 The information maintained by employers is the basis for
confirming that the proper tax-ultimately owed by the employeehas been withheld and paid.

15. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
CONSUMPTION TAx TRENDS 2014: VAT/GST AND EXCISE RATES, TRENDS AND POLICY
9 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ctt-2014-en.
16. Id. at 14.

ISSuES

17. Sarah W. Salter, E-Commerce and International Taxation, 8 NEw ENG.J. OF INT'L
& CoMP. LAw 5, 6 (2002).

18. Id.
19. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 3401 (a)-3406 (2012).
20. See 26 U.S.C. § 3504; Pub. 15 (CircularE), Employer's Tax Guide for Use in 2016,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, at 41 (Dec. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Employer's Tax Guide],
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl5.pdf.
21. Employer's Tax Guide, supra note 20, at 41.
22. Id. at 5-6.
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This information maintenance and reporting is no less essential to
sales and use tax enforcement. By their nature, such taxes are
imposed on the day-to-day purchases by individuals, virtually none of
whom should be expected to maintain detailed records of those
purchases, and a number of whom (e.g., minors, those with
disabilities, transients, etc.) could hardly be required to do so." But
unlike consumers, sellers do maintain detailed sales records for a
multitude of reasons, including customer relations, marketing,
obtaining credit, financial accounting, and federal income tax
compliance.' It is unremarkable, therefore, that the state sales and
use tax enforcement system also takes advantage of this detailed sales
information, requiring that sellers use it to report the tax. The seller
will not only file a report with the state tax agency but will also
provide to the customer some type of a bill of sale or invoice showing
tax charged and collected as part of the sale." Not only would this
provide the customer with documentation that the customer's use tax
obligation has been discharged, it would also allow states to perform
other actions with respect to enforcement, such as audits.
States may also reasonably conclude that requiring sellers to report
certain information, with or without collection of the tax, will
increase compliance.
This has been demonstrated where, for
example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) imposes certain
information reporting requirements without the requirement to
withhold or collect." In those situations, the information-reporting
obligation, by itself, will increase tax compliance by the party
required to pay the tax.
And, in situations in which the taxpayer
23. The authors are aware of no states that impose a general requirement upon
such individuals to maintain records for the purpose of verifying the proper amount
of taxes paid.
24. See for example the general requirements for record keeping imposed by
Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1 (a) (1990); see also Ridgeley A. Scott, Reimbursed Employee
Expenses: New Tales from the Grimm Brothers, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1 (1991) which
recounts efforts by the federal government to craft requirements for business record
keeping that would obviate the need for record keeping by employees, something
that has not worked well, in the area of non-taxable expense reimbursement.
25. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-26-106 (2010).
26. See Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006: Overview, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 6,
2012) ("[C]ompliance is far higher when reported amounts are subject to
information reporting and, more so, when subject to withholding.").
27. Id. (estimating the net misreporting percentage, "defined as the net
misreported amount as a ratio of the true amount," at eight percent for amounts
subject to substantial information reporting alone, and fifty-six percent for amounts
subject to no withholding or information reporting); IRS Releases New Tax Gap
Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain Statistically Unchangedfrom Previous Study, INTERNAL
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must rely on the third-party information to be able to voluntarily
comply (that is, to self-assess), this information-reporting obligation is
not merely helpful, but is essential.
But the states' ability to impose a tax collection obligation on
sellers has been limited by the Supreme Court. Under the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a state cannot require a remote
seller to collect sales tax unless that seller has some sort of physical
presence within that state." In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department
of Revenue of Illinois" and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,so the Court held
that requiring out-of-state mail-order sellers to collect the sales tax
imposed an undue burden on those sellers" including, in particular,
"[t]he many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in
administrative and record-keeping requirements.""
In Quill, for the first time, the Court delineated two distinct
standards for state taxing jurisdiction, or nexus, under the Due
Process Clause and Commerce Clause." Under the Due Process
Clause, a seller establishes a nexus for sales and use tax purposes if it
purposefully directs its activities to residents of the state." This is a
relatively low threshold, often referred to as "minimum contacts."35
The Commerce Clause, however, requires a "substantial nexus," and
for sales tax collection purposes, physical presence is the required
bright-line rule." The Court's decision in Quill in 1992 not to

SERV. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-New-Tax-GapEstimates%3B-Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-Unchanged-From-PreviousStudy (reporting that "amounts subject to little or no information reporting had a
[fifty-six] percent net misreporting rate in 2006").
REVENUE

28. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311, 317 (1992).

The North

Dakota Commissioner of Taxation, Heidi Heitkamp, at the time of the case, is now
the U.S. Senator from North Dakota. She delivered the opening address at American
University Law Review's 2016 Symposium discussing how it was that Quill came to be
litigated in the manner that it was and also provided fascinating insight on the
history of that litigation.

29. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
30. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see generally Richard
D. Pomp, RevisitingQuill, Bellas Hess, and Miller Brothers, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115 (2016).

31. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-60; Quill 504 U.S. at 314-15.
32. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759 (footnotes omitted) (noting that there thousands
of tax rates throughout the country and that exemptions and administrative rules
differed between states).

33.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.

34. Id. at 306, 312 (stating that notice or fair warning is sufficient to satisfy the
Due Process Clause nexus requirement).

35. Id. at 307.
36.

Id. at 311.
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overrile its 1967 decision in Bellas Hess relied heavily on stare decisis.17
The Court also expressed that this decision was "made easier" by the fact
that Congress could overnile Bellas Hess, if it chose to."
It is important to also note that under two other Supreme Court
cases, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson" and Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington
State Department of Revenue,' third parties acting on behalf of a seller
within a state are deemed to create a nexus for the seller under both
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause." This type of
nexus is sometimes referred to as representational nexus, and has
been relied upon in a number of cases." The Scholastic Book Clubs
cases, in particular, are notable. The third parties who created nexus
for the out-of-state sellers in those cases were not typical salespeople
and were not affiliated with the seller; instead, they were school
teachers who helped students place orders and also helped deliver
the books sold by the seller." The Connecticut Supreme Court
found that the teachers acted as Scholastic's representatives, even
though there was no agreement compelling them to serve as its
agents or salespeople and they received no direct compensation from
Scholastic."'
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee noted that
Scholastic utilized Tennessee schools and teachers to facilitate sales
to school children in Tennessee, and the teachers created "a de facto

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 317.
Id. at 318-19.
362 U.S. 207 (1960).

40.

483 U.S. 232 (1987), superseded by statutr WASH. REv. CODE. § 82.04.440 (1987).

41.

Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250; Scripto, 362 U.S. at 208-11.

42. See, e.g., Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 79-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't v.

Barnesandnoble.com LLC, 2013-NMSC-023, 303 P.3d 824, 826-27, 829 (N.M. 2013);
Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954, 956-57, 961 (N.Y. 1995). See
generally Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Wash., 419 U.S. 560
(1975). The taxpayer-appellee in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue of
Washington challenged Washington's business and occupation tax on Due Process
Clause and Commerce Clause grounds. 419 U.S. 560, 562 (1975). Standard's only instate presence was one employee, who worked from his home. Id. at 561. His
primary duty was to consult with Boeing, Standard's primary customer, regarding its
anticipated needs for aerospace fasteners and to follow up on any post-delivery
difficulties. Id. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the imposition of the tax
because the appellant's full-time job allowed Standard to keep Boeing as its primary
customer. Id. at 562, 564.
43. See, e.g., Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 38 A.3d

1183, 1186-87 (Conn. 2012); Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Farr, 373 S.W.3d 558,
563-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
44. Scholastic Book Clubs, 38 A.3d at 1199-200.
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marketing and distribution mechanism."" Both courts therefore
held that Scholastic's connections with the state's schools and
teachers established a "substantial nexus" sufficient to justify the
imposition of sales and use tax under the Commerce Clause."6
Although the majority in Quill referred to the physical presence
rule, or substantial nexus rule, as a "bright line rule," it is debatable
whether this turned out to be true. The majority's apparent hope
that a bright-line rule would simplify determining when sellers are
required to collect the tax, was doubted even in 1992, by Justice
White who stated in a separate opinion: "[I]t is a sure bet that the
vagaries of 'physical presence' will be tested to their fullest in our
courts."" Justice White was correct; in an economy that is moving
from tangible goods to intangibles and services, states are finding that
the physical presence standard is badly matched to how business is
now being done.
One way that states have brought the physical presence standard
into better alignment with e-commerce is through the enactment of
so-called "click-through nexus" statutes (also known as "Amazon"
statutes). ' These statutes impose a collection and reporting duty on
some remote retailers who market using in-state representatives
compensated on a commission-like basis, including in-state
organizations that put on their own websites a link to the seller's
website (i.e., online referrals via weblink). o New York was the first
state to enact click-through nexus legislation, in 2008." The law was

45. Scholastic, 373 S.W.3d at 565.
46. Scholastic Book Clubs, 38 A.3d at 1200; Scholastic, 373 S.W.3d at 565. But see
Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Dep't of Treasury, Revenue Div., 567 N.W.2d 692,
695 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that imposition of the sales and use tax did
violate the Commerce Clause because "the use of teachers, without more, [did] not
establish a substantial nexus").
47. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 331 (1992) (WhiteJ., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
48. See generally Laura Mahoney et al., States See Little Revenue from Online Sales Tax
Laws, Keep Pressure on Congress, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/states-little-revenue-n17179881226. Even in cases not involving
digital goods or services, state courts were imposing a quantitative or qualitative test
on whether physical presence existed. See Richard D. Pomp, STATE AND LoCAL
TAXATION

9-157 (8th ed. 2015).

49. David H. Gershel, Comment, The Day of Reckoning: The Inevitable Application of
State Sales Tax to ElectronicCommerce, 14 TUL.J. TECH. & INTELl. PROP. 335, 337 (2011).
50. Mahoney et al., supra note 48.
51. Act of April 23, 2008, Ch. 57, pt. 00-1, 2008 N.Y. Laws 2844 (codified at N.Y.
TAX LAw §§ 1101 et seq.) (adding a subparagraph (vi) to N.Y. TAX LAw § 1101(b) (8)
that reads: "For purposes of subclause (I) of clause (C) of subparagraph (i) of this
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immediately challenged by Amazon.com and Overstock.com." New
York's click-through nexus law was upheld by the state's highest court
against facial challenges on Due Process and Commerce Clause
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
grounds,
Nevertheless, e-commerce in particular has proven to be a challenge
for state enforcement systems constrained by a physical presence
requirement.5 5 A number of states that have passed click-through
nexus statutes have seen remote sellers simply terminate their
agreements with in-state representatives."
Since Quill, there have been repeated efforts to expand state
taxation of remote sales via congressional action. 7 Of all of the

paragraph, a person making sales of tangible personal property or services taxable
under this article ("seller") shall be presumed to be soliciting business through an
independent contractor or other representative if the seller enters into an agreement
with a resident of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other
consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on
an [I] nternet website or otherwise, to the seller, if the cumulative gross receipts from
sales by the seller to customers in the state who are referred to the seller by all
residents with this type of an agreement with the seller is in excess of ten thousand
dollars during the preceding four quarterly periods ending on the last day of
February, May, August, and November. This presumption may be rebutted by proof
that the resident with whom the seller has an agreement did not engage in any
solicitation in the state on behalf of the seller that would satisfy the nexus
requirement of the United States constitution during the four quarterly periods in
question. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to narrow the scope of
the terms independent contractor or other representative for purposes of subclause
(I) of clause (C) of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph").
52. Overstock.com, Inc. v. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 622
(N.Y. 2013) (noting that both Amazon.com, LLC and Overstock.com were plaintiffs).
53. Id. at 622.
54. Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013)
(denying petition for writ of certiorari); Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Taxation & Fin., 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
55. See generally Laura Mahoney et al., supra note 48.
56. See, e.g., id. ("Amazon has terminated and will not accept new affiliates in
Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina or Rhode Island.
Overstock.com Inc. will not accept affiliates in New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Illinois, Arkansas or any state in which the law deems Overstock to have nexus for sales
and use tax purposes because of affiliate agreements, according to its website.").
57. See, e.g., Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015, H.R. 2775, 114th Cong.
(2015); Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 684, 113th Cong. (2013);
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 336, 113th Cong. (2013); Marketplace Fairness
Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011); Marketplace Equity Act of 2011, H.R. 3179, 112th
Cong. (2011); Main Street Fairness Act, S. 1452, 112th Cong. (2011); Main Street
Fairness Act, H.R. 5660, 111th Cong. (2010); Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification
Act, H.R. 3396, 110th Cong. (2007); Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S.
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proposed bills introduced, the Marketplace Fairness Act5" (MFA) of
2013 has had the most success. The MFA would permit states that are
members to the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, or that
meet specifications under the MFA, to require sellers to collect and
remit sales and use taxes on remote sales." On May 6, 2013, the U.S.
Senate passed the MFA by a majority vote of sixty-nine to twenty-seven.'
However, the bill languished in the House and eventually died."' The
MFA of 2015" was reintroduced in the Senate in March, 2015 and
referred to the Senate Committee on Finance, where it remains."
So, for over two decades, the problem has grown. The Supreme
Court has not seen fit to overturn Quill, and Congress has not
accepted the Court's invitation to address the problem through
federal legislation. Meanwhile, the EU has expanded the general
scope of the VAT imposed by countries within the Union to include
the electronic sale of digital goods and, more recently, to require that
remote sellers collect the rate of tax imposed in the country where
the consumer purchases those goods."
II.

THE

EU VAT SYSTEM AND RELATED ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

In 2015, the EU updated the general VAT rules applicable to
digital companies.' The VAT is a broad, general consumption tax
assessed on the value added to goods and services at each stage of
production.' The tax is calculated on each sale as a percentage of
the sale price minus the tax paid at previous stages." The 2015
2153, 109th Cong. (2005); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, S. 1736, 108th Cong.
(2003); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, H.R. 3184, 108th Cong. (2003).
58. H.R. 684; S. 336.
59. Id.
60. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress-ist Session, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/rollcall_1ists/rollcall-vote-cfm.cfm?congre
ss=1 13&session=1&vote=001 13 (last visited May 17, 2016).
61. See Federal: Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015 Introduced in US. Senate, KPMG
TAXWATcHI (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.kpmg-institutes.com/institutes/taxwatch/events/
2015/03/twist)31615/twist-031615-zlfed.html.
62. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015).
63. See S. 698-MarketplaceFairnessAct of2015, CONGRESS.GOv, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/1 14th-congress/senate-bill/698?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22s698%
5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultlndex=1 (last visited May 17, 2016).
64. Council Directive 2008/8/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 44) 11, 17-18.
65. Id.
Works, EUR. COMMISSION TAx'N & CUSTOMS UNION,
66. How VAT
http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/taxation/vat/how-vat-works/indexen.htm
(last visited May 17, 2016).
67. Id.
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update built on the EU's 2003 measure requiring companies located
outside the EU to collect the VAT on the sale of goods and services
digitally delivered to individual consumers in EU member states."
Under the previous iteration of the rule, businesses selling digital
goods into Europe who are "non-established operators" (lacking a
fixed establishments in the EU) could charge consumer customers
the VAT of a single "member state of identification" with which they
have certain connections." Large digital companies like Amazon and
Google neatly minimized the applicable VAT by establishing their
member state of identification in countries with favorable VAT rates
(generally Luxembourg) and registering all their European sales
there.71 But, as of January 1, 2015, all digital companies-whether
located within or outside the EU-that sell telecommunications,
broadcasting, and electronic services to customers in EU countries
must collect and report the VAT based on the rate in the country
where the customer resides.7 ' The EU has also established a Mini One
Stop Shop72 (MOSS), which allows payments and returns to be made
electronically from a single Member State of Identification.7 ' The
applicable tax is broad: there is no minimum sales threshold, and
virtually all goods and services that can be purchased and downloaded
by retail consumers on the web fall within the scope of the VAT rules."
In 2003, the EU's imposition of tax reporting duties on remote
sellers of digital goods without a permanent establishment in the EU,
even at the single state's rate, was not without controversy. Although

68. Council Directive 2008/8/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 44) 11, 17-18.
69. Council Directive 2002/38/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 128) 41.
70. James Vincent, Apps, Ebooks, and Album DoonloadsAre About to Get More Expensive in
Europe, VERGE (Dec. 23, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/23
/7433281/eu-vat-changes-digital-goods-europe.
71. Council Directive 2008/8/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 44) 17-18.
72. The Mini One Stop Shop (MOSS), REVENUE IRISH TAX & CUSTOMS,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/vat/leaflets/mini-one-stop-shop.html
(last visited
May 17, 2016) ("The Mini One Stop Shop is an optional scheme which allows
businesses that supply telecommunications, broadcasting or e-services to consumers
in Member States in which they do not have an establishment to account for the VAT
due on those supplies via a web-portal in one Member State.").
73. Guide to the VAT Mini One Stop Shop, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2 (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/how-va
t.works/telecom/one-stop-shop-guidelines-en.pdf.
74. Rick Minor, European VAT and Changes in 2015: What U.S. Businesses Need to
Know Now About VAT on Digital Goods and Services Sold into the EU Consumer Market,
FORBES (May 15, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/
2014/05/15/european-vat-10-things-online-sellers-need-to-know-about-taxes-on-

digital-goods-and-services/#2715e4857a0b5b066f204290.
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no complaint was ever formally brought to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), Karen Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Council for
International Business's Subcommittee on e-Commerce, testified before
Congress that the disparity in VAT rates for EU and non-EU firns might
violate WTO rules." Like interstate taxation, international taxation is a
delicate balance, and there was some discussion of retaliatory taxation
from countries outside the EU, including the United States. 76 However,
because the consumption taxes in this country are imposed at the state
level, rather than at the federal level, it is unclear how any retaliatory
taxation would be instigated.
EU countries that impose a VAT have come to rely on a slightly
different enforcement approach than that taken by the United States.
Because of the nature of the VAT, rather than the ultimate seller
having the sole duty to collect, report, and pay over the tax, all sellers
in the chain of commerce must report information and collect tax on
their sales." Information reported by "up-stream" businesses can
therefore be compared with information reported by "down-stream"
businesses." Requiring businesses to maintain this information
fosters voluntary compliance, even where the information is not
automatically provided to the particular tax authority-especially
from businesses that can be expected to regularly maintain detailed
information in electronic format. 9
Even though the VAT enforcement system allows countries to use
information reported by businesses in the chain of commerce, when
a business is located in a non-VAT country, or a VAT country that
does not cooperatively share information, that mechanism can break
down. So, for example, while U.S. businesses have been required to

75. U.S. Relations with a Changing Europe: Differing Views on Technology Issues:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on EuropeanAffairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th
Cong. 14-16 (2003) (statement of Karen Myers, Chairman, Subcomm. on ECommerce, U.S. Council for International Business).
76. Richard Ruben, U.S. Treasury's Lew Challenges EU on Corporate Tax
Investigations,WALL ST.J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 6:58 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s(reporting
treasurys-lew-challenges-eu-on-corporate-tax-investigations-1 455177782
the Senate Finance Committee's suggestion to impose retaliatory double taxes on
European companies).
77. Derek Thompson, How Does a "Value Added Tax" Work, Anyway?, ATLANTic
(Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/03/how-does-avalue-added-tax-work-anyway/36834.
78. Id.
79. See Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and SelfEnforcement in the Value Added Tax 24-25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 19199, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl9199.
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collect the VAT since 2003, there appears to be either a general lack
of awareness or a lack of willingness to cooperate."' Regardless of
their authority and unquestioned jurisdiction to impose tax, the EU
countries can face the same kind of practical difficulties that any
enforcement action over a remote actor is bound to face."' Some
believe the tax may be unenforceable without the cooperation of the
U.S. government:
Enforcement will be difficult without Washington's help, but
Europe's tax collectors are determined to try. U.S. businesses with
a branch office in Europe, for example, could probably be forced
to comply. Another option being considered is "blacking out" the
Web sites [of] companies that refuse to register for VAT collection.
But consider that despite having highly centralized systems of Internet
service provision, authoritarian governments (such as China) have
been unable to control access to dissident Web sites. The Internet is
simply too massive and decentralized to police effectively.
That enforcement problem is why Europe is calling for increased
"international collaboration" on tax collection, meaning that the
IRS would monitor U.S. companies' compliance with EU tax law. 2
Other efforts have been attempted to augment VAT enforcement.
In 2006, the United Kingdom implemented a "Web Robot," an
application designed to spot high-volume traders that fail to register
for the VAT." It is unclear how successful that effort has been, but
the Web Robot's expansion to small businesses and personal ventures
in 2011 indicates at least some success.84
In May 2015, the European Commission announced that an
estimated C168 billion in VAT revenues had been lost due to
noncompliance or non-collection in 2013-amounting to 15.2% of
all VAT revenue.
This may be attributable to a lack of awareness of
the collection duty, but there is also a possibility that smaller

80.

US Digital Companies and Their EU VAT Challenge, TAXAMo (Nov. 11, 2014),

https://www.taxamo.com/us-digital-companies-eu-vat.
81. See id.
82. Aaron Lukas, The VAT-Man Cometh?, CATO INSTITUTE - COMMENTARY (Aug. 21,
2000), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/vatman-cometh.
83.

COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL, UK NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, VAT ON E-

COMMERCE 6 (2006), https://www.nao.org.uk/report/vat-on-e-commerce.
84. SeeJulia Kollewe, The Dangers of Moonlightingfrom Work, AOL (June 18, 2011,
updated Sept. 30, 2011, 12:22 PM), http://money.aol.co.uk/2011/06/18/thedangers-of-moonlighting-from-work.
85.

CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, STUDY TO QUANTIFY AND ANALYSE

THE VAT GAP [N THE EU MEMBER STATES 7 (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation

customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/vat-gap2013.pdf.
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companies are ceasing to sell into the EU due to the new rules.
There have also been reports that the VAT credit and refund
mechanisms, and the administration of those mechanisms, have been
the targets of outright fraud." In 2015, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) released a report titled
Addressing the Tax Challenges of the DigitalEconomy." In the report, the
OECD notes that direct-consumption-based taxes on digital commerce
raise questions regarding nexus; how to value data generation for tax
purposes; and the characterization of transactions generally."
The OECD's report also contains some suggested changes to the
enforcement system, including a "significant economic presence"
nexus standard." Such a standard might use a sales threshold, or
might also consider other "digital factors" when imposing regulatory
duties such as whether the seller has obtained a local domain name,
uses a local platform, or takes local payment options."o It could also
look to whether the seller has ongoing customer relationships, and
especially whether the seller collects substantial data from those
Interestingly, the OECD's report also discusses a
customers. 1
withholding mechanism for collecting tax on digital transactions,
imposed not on sellers in the chain of commerce, but on payment

86. See Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We
Know, and What Can Be Done? 8 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 07/31, 2007),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0731.pdf. Professor Ainsworth,
who also authored an Article in this Symposium Issue, has written extensively on the
VAT and consumption tax fraud. For his most recent writings, see Richard T.
Ainsworth, A Perfect Storm in the EU VAT: Kittel, R, and MARC, 66 TAx NOTES INT'L
849 (2012), Richard Ainsworth, An American Look at Zappers, Physikalisch-Technische
Bundesanstalt, Revisionssicheres System Zur Aufzeichnung Von Kassenvorgangen Und
Messinformationenthe (B.U. Sch. L., L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 12-14 2012),
T.
Richard
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2026140,
Ainsworth, Real-Time Solution to Refund Fraud: VAT Lessons From Belgium, Brazil, and
Quebec, 66 TAx NOTES INT'L 533 (2012), Richard T. Ainsworth, Technology, VAT
Compliance, and "Black Swan" Blindness, 66 TAX NOTES INT'L 275 (2012), Richard
Ainsworth, VATFraud Mutation, Part 3: "Pull"Missing TraderFraud and Deutsche Bank,
TAx NOTES INT'L (forthcoming 2016).
87. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGrFAL EcoNOMY, AcnON 1:
2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/
taxation/addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digital-economy-action-I-2015-final-

report_9789264241046-en#pagel.
88. Id. at 99.
89. Id. at 107 (suggesting this new nexus concept to reflect situations where
businesses have a sustained economic presence in a country through digital
technology rather than by having a physical presence).

90. Id. at 107-09.
91. Id. at 101; 110-11.
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processors, stating: "One possible solution would be to require
intermediaries processing the payment [for purchases] to withhold
on the payment in a B2C context. As a practical matter, however, this
presents several technical issues."" This proposed withholding
mechanism, however, would need to be further developed.
To summarize, the EU appears to be committed to imposing tax on
sales of digital goods and to taking the necessary steps to enforce that
tax even where sellers are outside the EU. Assuming EU countries
are successful, the enforcement mechanisms they use may inspire
imitation. Their success in enforcing the VAT on sales made by U.S.
companies might also create some pressure for the United States to
collect sales taxes due on digital goods sold electronically to
consumers in this country to level the global playing field.
III. THE SEEDS OF INVENTION

What alternative approach might individual American states take to
improve the enforcement system used for sales and use taxes? The
"seeds" of such an approach have already been planted.
The first seed of the alternative approach has been around for
some years. After Quill, states began experimenting with ways to
allow consumers to self-report the tax on their purchases from
remote vendors." States also have made an effort to simplify use tax
reporting as much as possible for in-state consumers, particularly
because many are unaware of the reporting requirement and have
failed to keep records of their purchases." For example, California
eases the burden on taxpayers by allowing them to report use tax
based either on their actual purchases or by using a percentage of
their income, using a "look-up table."" This approach, also taken by
a number of other states," is further simplified by providing

92.

Id. at 114.

93. See Annette Nellen, Still Seeking Sales and Use Taxes, AICPA (Sept. 12, 2013),
https://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCERCONTENT/Newsletters/A
rticles_2013/Tax/SalesAndUseTaxesjsp.
94. See Kathy M. Kristof, Bought it Out of State? You May Owe "Use Tax", L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/18/business/fi-perfinl8.
95. See Use Tax Liability Table, CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION,
https://www.boe.ca.gov/info/usejtaxtable.html (last visited May 17, 2016).
96. See Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns \ Reportingand Collections,JUX LAw
FIRM,
http://jtix.law/use-tax-collection-on-income-tax-returns-reporting-andcollections (last visited May 17, 2016). Professor Richard Pomp states that L.L. Bean
was instrumental in getting Maine to adopt a box on its income tax return estimating
how much use tax was owed by various income groups in an unsuccessful attempt to
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reporting information and instructions." Some data shows that states
with look-up tables for reporting use tax have a higher "participation"
rate (that is, a higher percentage of taxpayers reporting some
amount of tax) but a slightly lower per return amount." In any case,
compliance rates are uneven.9 9
These consumer-reporting mechanisms have not been subjected to
legal challenges, but they do have two significant downsides. First, if
a resident reports no use tax, it may be because she has determined
that she does not owe any tax, or it may be that she is simply
disregarding her reporting obligation. To determine which is the case,
the state would have to perform an audit on that resident. Auditing any
significant percentage of resident consumers, however, would be
impossible. But the second, and perhaps more important downside, is
that it is not clear how the state could possibly verify that additional tax is
due, even with an audit, given that most individuals do not regularly
keep records of all purchases so that the tax owed can be verified.
The second seed of the alternative enforcement approach for
remote sales tax has been suggested in this Article, but has not been
applied in the way that it could be. It involves using employers to
withhold and pay the use tax owed by resident wage-earners. Those
employers already withhold federal and possibly state income taxes
and also report unemployment impositions to the states."oo Perhaps
one reason states have not attempted this employer-withholding
approach is because it would require the state to assert the amount of
tax due for each employee and would also require it to show some
reasonable basis for that amount. Also, if taxpayers can simply apply
for refunds of the amounts withheld, the state would still need to
have some means to verify those refunds.
Colorado has provided the third seed of the alternative approach.
Under Colorado law, sellers who are "retailers" and are "doing
keep the U.S. Supreme Court from hearing Quill. Richard D. Pomp, STATE AND
LocALTAxATION6-42 n.183 (8th ed. 2015).
97. See Forms & Instructions, California 540, 2015 PersonalIncome Tax Booklet, CAL.
FRANCHISE TAx BD., https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2015/15-540ins.pdf (last visited
May 17, 2016).

98. See Nina Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns, ST. TAX NoTES, July
2012, at 23, 26.
99. See MAc TAYLOR, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIvE ANALYST's OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING
CALIFORNIA'S SALES TAx 22 (2015), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/

sales-tax/understanding-sales-tax-050615.aspx ("Due to data limitations, it is difficult
to estimate the 'tax gap'-the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid. Recent
estimates indicate that California's use tax gap could be $1 billion or more.").
100. 26 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012).
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business" in the state have a statutory tax collection and reporting
duty."" But because Quill prevents Colorado from imposing a taxcollection duty on out-of-state sellers that lack physical presence,
those retailers that do not collect the tax are instead required to
comply with the information-reporting requirements under a statute
passed in 2010."112 This statute requires the seller to provide each
purchaser with a notice that tax has not been collected and will have
to be paid by the purchaser."" The seller must also mail annual
notices to Colorado customers who purchased more than $500 in
goods from them in the preceding calendar year, informing the
customer of purchase dates, items bought, and the amount of each
Finally, the seller must annually report
purchase made.""'
information on Colorado purchasers to the state revenue
department, including purchasers' names, billing addresses, shipping
addresses, and total purchase amounts for the previous calendar
year.' 5 While Colorado has taken the lead in implementing this
information reporting approach, other states may well decide to
follow that lead. For several years, states in the Multistate Tax
Commission's Executive and Uniformity Committees have been
working on a model statute using this approach.'"'
Information supplied by sellers under this type of informationreporting system could address both the issue of how a state might
verify that resident self-reported tax is accurate, and how states might
determine amounts to be withheld under an employer-withholding
system. But, the Colorado law was quickly challenged by sellers who
dispute its constitutionality."" The Tenth Circuit ultimately rejected
that challenge, and its ruling is discussed further in the next section.

COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 39-26-102(3), (8), 39-26-105, 39-26-204(2) (2014).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5) (2010).
COLO. CODE REGs. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(2) (2010).
COLO. CODE REGs. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(3) (a) (ii).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5) (d) (II) (A).
See Model Sales and Use Tax Notice and Reporting Statute, MULTISTATE TAX
COMMISSION, http://www.mtc.gov/Uniformity/Project-Teams/Model-SU-Notice-andReporting-Statute (last visited May 17, 2016) (stating that work on this project was
suspended pending the outcome of litigation regarding Colorado's law); see also
Status Report on Model Sales and Use Tax Notice and Reporting Statute, MULTISTATE TAX
COMMIsSION (July 31, 2014), http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTax_
Commission/Committees/ExecutiveCommittee/ScheduledEvents/47th_Annual
Meetings/UTR%20EC%2OMemo%20(07-31-2014).pdf.
107. Sarah McGahan, Use Tax Reporting: Is Colorado Back in Business?, TAx ADVISER
(Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2013/dec/salt-dec2013.html.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Building on Colorado law, the approach suggested here would
require states to do the following: (1) collect data from remote
sellers on sales made to in-state residents, broken down by general
taxable category; (2) use that data to determine the tax amounts
owed by in-state residents (consumers) on remote purchases; and (3)
inform residents of the tax due and provide their employers with the
information allowing them to withhold the tax from wages paid. So,
for example, based on information reported by remote sellers, the
state might determine that a resident made $1000 of remote taxable
purchases in the prior year. Assuming an eight percent tax rate, the
resident would owe eighty dollars. Rather than requiring the resident
to pay this tax directly to the state all at once, the state could allow
the resident's employer to withhold the tax and pay it over to the
state. Assuming the employee is paid monthly in this case, the
employer would withhold $6.14 each pay period. States might
determine that it is necessary to impose other requirements as well.
For example, the withholding mechanism might apply only up to a
maximum amount. So, if the resident owed more than $200 in total tax,
for instance, the excess would have to be paid immediately or interest
might also be assessed. States might impose a requirement for paying
estimated taxes, based on similar criteria used for income taxes. 08
Residents who are not currently employed would also have to pay the tax
directly, or perhaps through estimated quarterly payments.'
Whether such an approach could be adopted depends on whether
we expect the Tenth Circuit's ruling to be the final word and perhaps
whether certain other legal questions can be answered, as discussed
further in the next section. But it also ultimately depends on the
technical feasibility of this approach-and in particular, whether remote
sellers would be able to provide the information necessary. So, a little
perspective on the issue of feasibility is in order before its legal analysis.
In 1992, when Quill upheld the bright-line physical presence rule"o
of Bellas Hess,"' no one had yet made an online retail purchase."'
The first World Wide Web server and browser, created by Tim
Berners-Lee in 1990, opened for commercial use in 1991, the year

108. See 26 U.S.C. § 6654(d) (1) (B) (2012).
109. See 26 U.S.C. § 6654(c).
110. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992).
111. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758-59 (1967).
112. See Dave Roos, The History of E-commerce, HowSTuvFWORKs.coM (Apr. 15,
2008), http://money.howstuffworks.com/history-e-conmerce.htm (stating that the
first processors of online credit card sales emerged in 1994 and 1995).
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litigation began in Quill."
That year, the National Science
Foundation eliminated a ban on commercial businesses operating
over the Internet, which allowed for the possibility of Web-based ecommerce."" The first secured online purchase did not take place
until 1994." From there, Internet sales skyrocketed, largely due to
the development of security protocols and high speed Internet
connections such as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), making faster
connection speeds and faster online transaction capability possible."'
In 2010, the Boston Consulting Group determined that the
Internet accounted for 4.7% of all U.S. economic activity in that year,
exceeding the contributions of the federal government (4.3%).'7 If
the Internet was considered its own industry, it would be larger than
the United States' education, constructions, or agricultural
industries."' According to a 2014 online retail sales forecast from
Forrester Research Inc., U.S. e-retail sales (that is, consumer sales)
are expected to grow from $263 billion in 2013 to $414 billion in
2018, amounting to a total annual growth rate of 9.5%."" The study

predicts that e-retail's share of total retail sales will continue to increase,
from eight percent in 2013 to eleven percent in 2018.12' This forecasted
growth from $263 billion in 2013 to $414 billion in 2018 is a 57.4%
increase in the dollar amount of consumer sales.' 2 ' Contrast these
online sales with $180 billion in remote (mail-order) sales in 1992.'
The technology that enables Internet retailers to be so competitive
with each other also gives them distinct competitive advantages over
Internet retailers require minimal
brick-and-mortar stores.
downtime, and can remain open twenty-four hours a day, year-round.
113. Id.; see North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), revd, 504
U.S. 298 (1992).
114. Roos, supra note 112.
115. The item purchased was a pepperoni pizza with mushrooms and extra cheese
from Pizza Hut. Kayla Webley, A Brief History of Online Shopping, TIME.coM (July 16,
2010), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2004089,00.html.
116. History ofE-Commerce, SPIREcAST (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.spirecast.com/
history-of-e-commerce.
117. Annalyn Censky, IntemetAccountsfor4.7% of US. Economy, CNNMoNEY (Mar. 19,2012,
4:00 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/19/news/economy/internet economy.
118. Id.
119. Allison Enright, US. Online Retail Sales Will Grow 57% by 2018; Projected Growth,
INTERNETRETAILER (May 12, 2014, 11:50 AM), https://www.internetretailer.com/
2014/05/12/us-online-retail-sales-will-grow-57-2018.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 329 (1992) (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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Retail websites are a natural extension of the social networking
community because large online retailers generally offer customers
the opportunity to post comments on, and see reviews of, every aspect
of a product. 123 Online shopping also offers easy price comparisonan ability that has overlapped into the real world: Amazon now offers
a price-checking app that allows shoppers to scan a product at the
mall and purchase it online.'2
When it comes to their ability to
collect information, online sellers clearly have advantages. In the
world of online sales, information is currency; online sellers
habitually track purchasers' activities in order to target their
marketing. 2
Internet retailers collect and purchase an incredible
range of information:
[Stores collect] demographic information like your age, whether
you are married and have kids, which part of town you live in, how
long it takes you to drive to the store, your estimated salary,
whether [you have] moved recently, what credit cards you carry in
your wallet and what Web sites you visit. [Stores] can buy data about
your ethnicity, job history, the magazines you read, if [you have] ever
declared bankruptcy or got divorced, the year you bought (or lost)
your house, where you went to college, what kinds of topics you talk
about online, whether you prefer certain brands of coffee, paper
towels, cereal or applesauce, your political leanings, reading habits,
26
charitable giving and the number of cars you own.'

123.

See Matt Townsend, Millennials Shunning Malls Speeds Web Shopping Revolution,
(June 25, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-06-25/millennials-shunning-malls-speeds-web-shoppingrevolution (noting that online shopping is popular with millennials because of the
convenience of doing it at home on their laptops); Bob Tedeschi, Like Shopping?
Social Networking?
Try Social Shopping, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/1I/technology/I1ecom.html
(noting that the
increasing popularity of customer reviews helps customers' engagement, similar to
social networking).
124. About the Amazon Shopping App, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeld=200777320 (last visited May 17, 2016); Amazon App,
ITUNES
PREVIEW,
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/amazon-app-shop-browsescan/id297606951?mt=8 (last visited May 17, 2016).
125. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Feb.
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.htnl.
126. Id.; see also Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management
Revolution, HARV. Bus. REV. (Oct. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-themanagement-revolution/ar ("It is estimated that Walmart collects more than 2.5
petabytes of data every hour from its customer transactions. A petabyte is one quadrillion
bytes, or the equivalent of about 20 million filing cabinets' worth of text.").
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS
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Online sellers use this data with great success to prompt online
purchases.' 2 7 For example, via its data collection, Target may infer
that a woman is pregnant-and start targeting her with relevant
advertisements-before anyone else knows.12 Amazon, meanwhile, has
patented what it calls "anticipatory shipping," a method through which it
can begin delivering packages even before a customer clicks "buy."'"'
Hulu publicizes the fact that it can provide targeted local
advertisements based on Nielsen DMA, state, or zip code." It knows
when an advertisement has been viewed to completion, and bases its
fees on that metric.'"' In April 2015, Hulu announced its plan to pair
with advertisers to make co-branded advertisements.13 2 In answer to
the question of "why a brand would want to pay extra money to create
a co-branded ad specifically to run on Hulu," Hulu responds that its
user data helps make more targeted ads.' "We're using our insights
to how our users search the site, come back, content they're
watching, what platforms they're watching [on]," says said Hulu's
senior VP-advertising sales Peter Naylor.'
Given the technology Internet sellers have developed to enable
them to successfully grow and compete, it is not unreasonable to
expect that these sellers could also report amounts of sales made to
customers by state and according to certain general categories. This
information would enable states to then determine the use taxes
likely owed by residents and to, if necessary, respond to any refund
claims or contested assessments.
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL OR OTHER IMPEDIMENTS

It does not appear that there are any serious legal constraints on
the states that would prevent them from using information to
determine and assess tax directly to resident purchasers. Nor does it
appear that there is any impediment to requiring an employer to
127. See McAfee & Brynjolfsson, supra note 126.
128. Duhigg, supra note 125.
129. Greg Bensinger, Amazon Wants to Ship Your Package Before You Buy I, WALL ST. J.:
DIGYIs (Jan. 17,2014, 3:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/17/
amazon-wants-to-ship-yotir-package-before-yoi-buy-it/?KEYWORDS-amazon+anticipatory.
130. Top Reasons to Buy Local on Hulu, HULU, http://www.hiili.com/advertising/local
(last visited May 17, 2016).
131. Id.
132. Tim Peterson, Hulu Wants Brands to Make Commercials with Hulu to Run on
Hulu, ADVERTISINGAGE (Apr. 29, 2015), http://adage.com/article/media/huilubrands-make-commercials-huiu/298272.

133. Id.
134. Id.
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withhold the tax from resident-employee wages. Of course, even
private parties are sometimes entitled to collect debts from employees
through garnishments, facilitated by employer withholding. But
there are potential obstacles to imposing a requirement on sellers to
provide the necessary information: possible ongoing constitutional
challenges to information reporting requirements including a
potential First Amendment challenge, and a possible challenge under
the "discriminatory tax" provision of the Internet Tax Freedom Act. 31
A.

The ConstitutionalChallenge to Colorado'sInformation Reporting
Requirements

After Colorado enacted its information reporting requirements,
remote sellers immediately objected, acting through the Direct
Marketing Association (DMA)-a trade association of retailers, many
of which sell to Colorado residents but do not collect sales and use
taxes.' 3 6
DMA filed suit claiming the notice and reporting
requirements
violated
the dormant Commerce
Clause
by
discriminating against and unduly burdening interstate commerce. 37
The case rose to the Supreme Court, but not on the merits of the

constitutional claims; instead, the issue concerned the Tenth Circuit's
finding that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) deprived the district court
ofjurisdiction over the suit.13

The TIA prohibits federal courts from

hearing suits involving the "assessment, levy or collection" of a state
tax. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's ruling, concluding
that for purposes of the TIA, the Colorado notice and reporting
requirement was not an "assessment, levy, or collection" of a tax.]3
This conclusion proved important in the ultimate determination of
the constitutional challenge on remand, as well.'
In general, the DMA faced a high bar. Lawmakers have great
latitude in adopting policies that differentiate between groups of
taxpayers. In the absence of any constitutional protection, the
default standard for evaluating any differences in state tax treatment

135. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998).
136. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
137. Id. at 1128.
138. Id. at 1129.
139. Id.
140. This argument, that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) issue and the
determination of the merits are connected, was made before the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Brief of Interested Law Professors as Amici Curiae at 15-17, Direct Mktg.
Ass'n v.
Brohl, 814 F.3d
1129
(10th
Cir.
2016)
(No.
12-1175),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2608807.
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is rational basis."' Under the Commerce Clause, however, state laws
may not discriminate against interstate commerce.' 2 In general, the
Supreme Court's modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
focuses
on
preventing
economic
protectionism." 3
Such
protectionism may be represented by barriers to entry imposed on
out-of-state businesses."' Or it may emanate from state laws that
burden out-of-state business interests and benefit instate interests. 11
The issue for the Tenth Circuit in DMA was unusual in that it could
have fallen between two recognized lines of Supreme Court
precedent. One line involves state tax laws as applied to out-of-state
businesses and to interstate commerce generally."" The other line of
cases involves state regulatory rules that may impact interstate
commerce or apply to out-of-state businesses. 117 How the Tenth
Circuit evaluated the discrimination depended on which line of cases
applied.'" But regardless, the claim before it had to include two
fundamental elements:
(1) differential treatment that actually
disfavors the challengers vis-1-vis another group, and (2) some basis
for asserting that the Commerce Clause entitles the challengers, as a
class, to a more exacting review of this differential treatment."'
Otherwise, as discussed above, the treatment would have fallen within
the legislature's broad discretion.

141. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
142. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994).

143.

City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).

144. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 944, 960 (1982) (striking down
Nebraska's statutory scheme of issuing permits allowing the withdrawal of ground
water in Nebraska for transport and use in a different state only if such state grants
reciprocal rights for groundwater to be withdrawn and transported to Nebraska).
145. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99 (explaining that if a state statute
discriminates against interstate commerce by effecting "differential treatment of instate and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter," it is per se invalid).
146. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 276 (1977) (involving
a tax assessed by Mississippi against a Michigan motor carrier that transported
automobiles into Jackson, Mississippi via railroad from out-of-state locations and then
delivered the automobiles to in-state car dealers via trucks).

147.

See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970)

(involving an

agricultural company with operations in Arizona and California burdened by Arizona
law requiring cantaloupes to be packaged in a certain manner before being
transported across state lines).
148. See generally Anna M. Hoti, Comment, Finishing what Quill Started: The
TransactionalNexus Test for State Use Tax Collection, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1449 (1996).
149. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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Upon remand of the case from the Supreme Court, the Tenth
Circuit, on February 22, 2016, ruled in favor of Colorado on the
merits.15 o It appears to have based its decision in significant part on
the Supreme Court's treatment of the TIA issue. In addition to
that Colorado's information reporting
having determined
requirements were not tax "collection" under the TIA, the Supreme
Court had also explicitly characterized Quills rule as applying to "tax
collection."'5

'

As far as the Tenth Circuit was concerned, this greatly

weakened the DMA's claims of discrimination and undue burden.' 5 2
More specifically, the circuit court of appeals rejected the DMA's
claim that information reporting requirements facially discriminated
against out-of-state retailers because, as a group, out-of-state companies
with some physical presence in the state were regularly subject to tax
collection obligations rather than information reporting.5 5 Therefore,
it was not a company's geographic location that determined whether it
was subject to the information reporting requirements, but rather
whether it could be required, under Quill, to collect tax.15
The Tenth Circuit also concluded that the information
requirements were not discriminatory in their effect.15 It rejected
the DMA's claim that "any differential treatment" between in-state
unconstitutional
establish
can
entities
and
out-of-state
5
owed tax
legally
consumers
Colorado
And, since
discrimination.'
regardless of whether the seller collected it or only reported
information to the state, the DMA could not argue that the
information reporting requirements put remote retailers at some
competitive disadvantage.'1 5 Moreover, the DMA had not shown that
the remote sellers it represented were similarly situated with any
comparison class of retailers for discrimination purposes.' 5 8 And
finally, the DMA had also not shown the requirements imposed a

discriminatory economic burden on remote vendors when compared
with the burden imposed on collecting sellers.' As far as the undue

150. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
151. Id. at 1137 (emphasizing the Supreme Court's characterization of Quill as
establishing a principle concerning the requirement to collect taxes).
152. Id. at 1139.
153. Id. at 1141.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1141-42.
156. Id. at 1142.
157. Id. at 1143.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1142-44.
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burden claim, the circuit court of appeals relied almost entirely on
the Supreme Court's holding that the information reporting
requirements were not the equivalent of tax collection under the TIA
and thus Quillwas not controlling."'
A concurrence filed by Tenth Circuit Judge Gorsuch provides
support for those who are considering whether an alternative
approach to use tax enforcement is feasible-at least from a legal
standpoint."' Prompted by the DMA's arguments, Judge Gorsuch
pondered the possibility that "many (all?) states can be expected to
follow Colorado's lead" and concluded that the Supreme Court, by
reinforcing a rule the Justices themselves admitted was "formalistic"
and "artificial," had virtually "invited states to impose comparable
duties" in response." 2 He went on to explain:
In this way, Quill might be said to have attached a sort of expiration
date for mail order and [I] nternet vendors' reliance interests . . . by
perpetuating its rule for the time being while also encouraging
states over time to find ways of achieving comparable results
through different means. In this way too Quill is perhaps unusual
but hardly unprecedented, for while some precedential islands
manage to survive indefinitely even when surrounded by a sea of
contrary law, a good many others disappear when reliance interests
never form around them or erode over time. And Quill's very
reasoning-its ratio decidendi-seems deliberately designed to
ensure that Bellas Hess's precedential island would never expand
but would, if anything, wash away with the tides of time. 163
The
challenge
to
Colorado-style
information
reporting
requirements may not be over. The DMA could petition the
Supreme Court to review the Tenth Circuit's ruling and challenges
could also be raised if other states pass similar statutes. The Supreme
Court could easily reach the same conclusion as the Tenth Circuitthat the information-reporting requirements imposed on remote
sellers are essentially a derivative set of the requirements imposed on
all sellers.'" It might also be difficult for the DMA to convince the

160. Id. at 1145-46.
161. Id. at 1147-48 (Gorsuch,J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1151.
163. Id.
164. See Alabama Dep't of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1136, 1143-44
(2015) (rejecting arguments by a rail carrier that, under a provision of the federal "4R Act" generally prohibiting taxes "that discriminate," the railroad need only show
that the state imposed one tax on its fuel purchases because a separate, but possibly
equivalent, tax was imposed on purchases by competitors); Associated Indus. of Mo.
v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 649-50, 656 (1994) (rejecting out-of-state businesses'
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Court that its remote-seller members, as a class, are entitled to a
heightened standard of review. Normally, if differential treatment
does not depend on whether the affected businesses operate
primarily outside the state, then the Commerce Clause will not
prevent that differential treatment.1 65
It should be noted that, outside of the sales tax arena, states have
sometimes imposed differential reporting requirements related to tax
enforcement on parties outside the state. For example, states may
require out-of-state businesses to provide information to establish that
they are not doing business in the state so as to be subject to a
particular tax. States may require partnerships with activities in the
6
state to withhold and report income tax for nonresident partners.""
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would now apply Quill so
as to create some sort of special sub-class of out-of-state businesses
entitled to more favorable treatment generally than other out-of-state
businesses. No case has ever held that Quill applies to create such a
sub-class for any purpose other than protecting out-of-state sellers
without physical presence from tax collection duties. Justice Kennedy,
writing separately in DMA, characterized Quill's holding as "tenuous"
and placed the blame on stare decisis.'" Justice Kennedy also cited
Pearson v. Callahan for the proposition that stare decisis is weakened
where "experience has pointed up the precedent's shortcomings."' 69
B.

PotentialFirst Amendment Challenge

In addition to claiming that the Colorado information-reporting
requirements violated the Commerce Clause, the DMA also claimed that
claims that they were automatically entitled to relief from the entire amount of a tax
rather than just the excess over what the in-state businesses paid).
165. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-99 (1997) (explaining that
differential tax treatment of out-of-state businesses is not discriminatory where the
treatment is due to differences in the products those businesses provide); see atso
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (holding that "[t]he fact
that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by
itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce").
166. See Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 162
P.3d 960, 962 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007).
167. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that that the Court relied on the doctrine "to reaffirm the
physical presence requirement . .. despite the fact that under the more recent and
refined test elaborated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 'contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result' as the Court had
reached in Bellas Hess." (internal citations omitted)).
168. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
169. DMA, 135 S. Ct. at 1135 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233).
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they violated customers' free speech rights under the First Amendment. 7 1o
The DMA did not include those claims in its Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, but noted:
The DMA in its Complaint contends that the Act and Regulations
chill the exercise of free speech of both consumers and retailers,
trample the right to privacy of consumers, and deprive retailers of
proprietary, trade secret information without due process or fair
compensation.. ..
These claims present important issues of
constitutional law, some of which are matters of first impression,
regarding the extent to which customer purchase information is
protected by the Constitution and whether the government may
compel disclosure of such information from businesses without any
procedures that allow either the customer or the retailer to raise
objections before the disclosure is made or penalties attach. "1
It is difficult to know exactly what DMA expects to allege if this
claim should ever be litigated, but there is one other federal district
court that has addressed the issue: the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington in Amazon.com LLC v. Lay."' In 2009,
the North Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) audited Amazon
and sent a request to the Internet retailer seeking "all information for
all sales to customers with a North Carolina shipping address by
month in an electronic format." 7 1 In response, Amazon provided the
DOR with "detailed information about millions of purchases made by
North Carolina customers" along with "the Amazon Specific
Identification Number ("ASIN") for every purchase,. . . which
permits access to the specific and detailed description of the
product," but without customer-identifying information.' 7 ' When
asked for this information, Amazon refused and filed suit in federal
district court alleging that the state's request for this information
would violate its customers' free speech rights.' 7 5
While it appears that North Carolina did not seek and did not
intend for Amazon to provide purchase information for in-state
customers that identified specific products, the state refused to return
the initial information Amazon provided while it was negotiating with
170. See First Amended Complaint at 27-29, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, Civil
Action No. 10-CV-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
171. Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 5 n.4, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, Civil Action No. 10-CV01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
172. 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
173. Id. at 1159.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1159-60.
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7
the company to provide the other information needed."'
The
federal district court ultimately concluded that Amazon was entitled
to summary judgment on its First Amendment claim, stating that
"[t] he First Amendment protects a buyer from having the expressive
content of her purchase of books, music, and audiovisual materials
disclosed to the government."'" The court reasoned that the fear of
government tracking would chill a customer's choice of what to read
or watch or listen to."' North Carolina could not show a compelling
reason to keep the purchase information because it admitted that it
had no need or use for the details of its residents' purchases."'
It seems that in most cases, First Amendment issues can be avoided
by ensuring that information required does not contain the details of
certain types of products purchased. Because sales and use tax
exemptions generally follow broad categories, observing this
limitation would not unduly hamper the proper calculation of tax.'s0

C.

The "Non-Discrimination"Provision of the Internet Tax Freedom Act

The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) prohibits "multiple or
discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce." 8 '
The term
"electronic commerce" generally includes all manner of commercial
transactions conducted over the Internet 8 2
The term
"discriminatory tax" is broadly defined. It includes a tax imposed on
Internet transactions unless the tax is also imposed (at rate that is the
same or higher) on transactions involving similar goods or services
176.
177.

Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1167.

178. Id. at 1168.
179. Id. at 1169.
180. The district court also held that North Carolina's overly broad request for
"all" information would violate the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), which
prohibits the providers of certain video products from disclosing "personally
identifiable information" as defined by the VPPA, which includes "information which
identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or
services from a video tape service provider."
18 U.S.C. §2710(a)(3) (2012);
Amazon.com LLC, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. Because this violation could also be
avoided by simply not requiring remote sellers to provide the titles or other
identifying information related to purchased video products or services, there is no
need to separately address this issue in this Article.
181. Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) § 1101 (a) (2), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681-719 (1998) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2012)).
182. Id. § 1104(3) ("[A]ny transaction conducted over the Internet or through
Internet access, comprising the sale, lease, license, offer, or delivery of property,
goods, services, or information, whether or not for consideration, and includes the
provision of Internet access.").

2016]

BEYOND QUILL AND CONGRESS

1193

.

accomplished through other means.'" A "discriminatory tax" also
includes a collection obligation that is imposed on "a different
person or entity than in the case of transactions involving similar. .
goods ...
accomplished through other means."'"' And it includes
any tax imposed where "the sole ability to access a site on a remote
seller's out-of-[s]tate computer server is considered a factor in
determining a remote seller's tax collection obligation.""11 It further
includes a tax collection obligation that is imposed because "a
provider of Internet access service or online services is deemed to be
the agent of a remote seller ... as a result of the display of a remote
seller's information or content on the [provider's] out-of-[s]tate
computer server."'" Finally, it includes a tax collection obligation
imposed because the provider is deemed to be the agent of the
remote seller "solely as the result of. . . the processing of orders
through the out-of-[s]tate computer server of a provider.""11
Because of ITFA, care must be taken in how tax or tax collection
duties are imposed on all sales across the Internet, including sales of
digital goods. It appears that ITFA's provisions are concerned with
imposing tax-collection obligations on e-comnmerce. There is no
prohibition under ITFA that would prohibit states frorm imposing
information-reporting requirements related to sales made into a state for
the purpose of use tax enforcement.'
Therefore, to the extent third
parties, including Internet providers or other intermediaries, have
information that can be usefil to states for determining resident use tax
liabilities, imposing an information-reporting requirement would be
permissible, even though imposing a tax-collection obligation would not.
Whether ITFA imposes any restraint on the ability of states to
impose on employers an obligation to withhold an amount for
payment of an employee's use tax is less clear. It is at least arguable
that this might be covered by ITFA's definition of "discriminatory
tax" as including a collection obligation imposed on "a different
person or entity than in the case of transactions involving similar ...

183. Id. § 1104(2) (A) (ii).
184. Id. § 1104(2) (A) (iii).
185. Id.§1104(2)(B)(i).
186. Id. § 1104(2) (B) (ii) (I).
187. Id. § 1104(2)(B)(ii)(II). An Internet access provider is "a person engaged in
the business of providing a computer and communications facility through which a
customer may obtain access to the Internet, but does not include a common carrier
to the extent that it provides only telecommunications services." Id. § I101(f) (2) (A).
188. See supra notes 173-87 and accompanying text (describing the ITFA and its
prohibitive provisions).
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goods. . . accomplished through other means."'" There have been
few challenges to a state tax under ITFA's "discriminatory tax"
provision.' 90 But in one, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that, under
ITFA, "performance marketing" (the use of certain marketing
approaches, which sellers pay for based on sales made) cannot be the
basis for asserting nexus over sellers that use the Internet unless the
state also asserts nexus on the basis of performance marketing done
through broadcast media or otherwise in Illinois."'
Similarly,
therefore, assuming the definition of "discriminatory tax" might
cover employer withholding of use tax, it would only apply if the tax
to be withheld was limited to tax on goods sold over the Internet.
Employer withholding certainly need not be limited to tax on goods
sold over the Internet. Rather, states could impose the withholdercollection requirement on any tax determined to be due on
purchases by residents where the seller does not include the tax,
regardless of how the sale is made.
CONCLUSION

This Article proposes that, depending on the ultimate outcome of
the DMA case and possibly similar litigation, states may have the
opportunity to bypass both Congress and the Supreme Court in
finding an alternative that will allow them to better enforce the sales
and use tax on remote sales. Of course, this begs the question
whether the DMA case itself might not someday end up back at the
Supreme Court. With respect to that prospect, the authors make no
But assuming Colorado-style information-reporting
prediction.
requirements withstand challenges by remote sellers the states may
want to contemplate how information reporting could, at least,
supplement the existing enforcement system and give them the
means to ensure that residents are paying the tax owed with as little
additional burden as possible. This further assumes-the authors
think, safely-that there has been and will continue to be a
revolution in information technology that will permit this adaptation.
It is, after all, this same technology that has, in large part, created the
problem with the existing enforcement system.

189. ITFA§ 1104(2) (A) (iii).
190. See, e.g., Performance Mktg. Ass'n v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ill. 2013);
America Online, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 942 A.2d 236, 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008),
affd, 963 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2008) (per curiam).
191. Perfomance Mktg. Ass'n, 998 N.E.2d at 59.

